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Research on public support for war shows that citizens are responsive to various aspects of strategic context. Less
attention has been paid to the core characteristics of the target state. In this comparative study we report survey
experiments manipulating two such characteristics, regime type and dominant faith, to test whether the ‘‘democratic
peace’’ and the ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ theses are reflected in U.S. and British public opinion. The basic findings show
small differences across the two cases: both publics were somewhat more inclined to use force against dictatorships than
against democracies and against Islamic than against Christian countries. Respondent religion played no moderating
role in Britain: Christians and nonbelievers were alike readier to attack Islamic states. However, in the United States,
the dominant faith effect was driven entirely by Christians. Together, our results imply that public judgments are
driven as much by images and identities as by strategic calculations of threat.
T
he ‘‘Bush doctrine’’ is one of preemption. If
force is to be used in response not only to actual
but also to potential future threats, the question
arises of how such threats are to be identified. One
answer is that key characteristics of the target state act
as a guide to its likely behavior. In justifications of
action in Afghanistan and Iraq, two such characteristics
were often invoked. One was the undemocratic nature
of the incumbent regimes. Tony Blair expressed his fear
‘‘that we wake up one day and we find that one of these
dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruc-
tion’’ (BBC 2004). And, as George W. Bush put it: ‘‘we
know that dictators are quick to choose aggression,
while free nations strive to resolve their differences in
peace’’ (CBS News 2004). This encapsulates the ‘‘dem-
ocratic peace’’: that democracies rarely go to war with
one another (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993). The second,
seldom as explicit but often discernible in these leaders’
rhetoric, is that these were Islamic countries. Bush
notoriously referred to the ‘‘war on terror’’ as a
‘‘crusade’’ (White House 2001), and Blair described
the ‘‘mutual enmity toward the West’’ of Islamic
extremists and their host regimes (BBC 2004). This
calls to mind the ‘‘clash of civilizations,’’ a term coined
by Samuel Huntington for whom ‘‘the most pervasive,
important and dangerous conflicts . . . are along the
line separating peoples of Western Christianity, on the
one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox people on the
other’’ (1996, 28). In short, it appears that U.S. and
U.K. elite military decisions are influenced by both the
regime type and the dominant faith in the target state.
This article is about public support for war and
whether it too is influenced by these factors. Are the
democratic peace and clash of civilizations theses also
reflected in public decisions about when force is
justified? Many studies demonstrate the importance
of public backing for military action (e.g., Gartzke
2000; Reiter 2003), and public support was prominent
in elite discussion of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
Here, we adopt a comparative perspective, collecting
parallel data from American and British samples. The
cases share obvious points in common, being the
leading players in Afghanistan and Iraq and having
experienced terrorist attacks on their own soil. Yet
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there are key differences. Most importantly, religion is
both more salient in society and more deeply politi-
cized in the United States than in Britain. The meaning
and significance of the ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ is
therefore likely to vary between the two.
First, we review research on the determinants of
public support for war. Then we examine why the
public may be readier to use force against dictator-
ships rather than democracies, and against Islamic
rather than Christian countries. Having set out the
data and measures used, we report results showing
that both political and religious differences encourage
support for military action, with surprisingly little
difference between the United States and Britain. Yet
this overall similarity is shown to conceal interesting
variation in the way that religious affiliation influen-
ces opinion in the two cases.
Public Support for War
One important strand of research into public support
for war has concerned the predispositions—the
values and principles—that citizens can use to lead
them to decisions on foreign policy issues. Prominent
among these value dimensions are internationalism
versus isolationism (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987;
Wittkopf 1990), militarism versus accommodation
(Alvarez and Brehm 2002, chap. 9; Holsti 2004),
national chauvinism (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti
2009), and broader political ideology (Russett, Hartley,
and Murray 1994). Clearly, core beliefs and values
leave some people strongly predisposed against mili-
tary action, but others far readier to support it.
Yet predispositions are only part of the story. Most
people endorse the use of force under certain circum-
stances but not others. Public opinion researchers have
ceased to see such ‘‘inconsistency’’ as evidence of
nonattitudes (Almond 1950; Converse 1964). Rather,
it attests to the sensitivity of public opinion to context
(Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Zaller 1992). Numerous
contextual factors affect public support for military
action, both at the outset of the war and as a conflict
progresses. Examples include: the objective of military
action (Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992); the extent of
international backing (Holsti 2004; Kull and Destler
1999) and domestic elite consensus (Larson 1996;
Zaller 1992); and casualty rates, especially when the
success of the mission seems in doubt (Gartner and
Segura 1998; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005).
Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) use survey
experiments to show the impact of both predispositions
and situational factors on American public support
for military action. They also highlight the interac-
tion between predispositions and context. In their
‘‘cognitive-interactionist’’ framework, the way that
people respond to situations depends on their broader
attitudes. So we should bear in mind that neither the
United States nor the British public is likely to react
homogenously to our key variables, target state regime,
and dominant faith, when considering the use of force.
In research on the situational factors influencing
public support for war, heavy emphasis has been placed
on strategic factors such as the objective of military
action and the interests at stake. One reason is that the
dependent variable in such studies has often been sup-
port for ongoing conflicts, whether real (e.g., Jentleson
1992) or hypothetical (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser
1999). As such, respondents could base their decisions
on the behavior (or ‘‘revealed preferences’’) of the
target state. However, in a preemptive context, a state’s
future behavior and thus the threat it poses have to be
inferred from some more static characteristics of that
state. Rather less attention has been paid to the way in
which the public might draw such inferences.
The most promising theoretical model in this
context is what Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston
(2005) call ‘‘image theory.’’ According to this model,
citizens of Country A form images of potential adver-
sary states based on three perceptions: of the relative
power of that state vis-a`-vis Country A, of the motiva-
tions of that state with respect to Country A, and of that
state’s political culture. With big players on the world
stage, these images swiftly become clearly defined and
wield a major influence over a range of foreign policy
opinions. For example, research on Americans’ foreign
policy attitudes in the 1980s was dominated by images
of the Soviet Union (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990). But
with less familiar states, the informational basis for
forming international images is likely to be flimsier. In
such situations, image formation is likely to be dele-
gated to simple heuristics (Sniderman, Brody, and
Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992). In the next two sections,
we explore the notions that regime type and dominant
faith could serve as such heuristics and will in turn
influence support for using force against that state.
Public Opinion and the
Democratic Peace
That democratic states rarely go to war with one
another is ‘‘probably the closest thing we have to a
law’’ in international relations (Mintz and Geva 1993,
484). Mor (1997) identifies two basic explanations,
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the institutional/structural and cultural/normative
accounts, in both of which public opinion can play
a role. This role is particularly central in the first. This
model ‘‘follows the Kantian premise that democratic
consent of the governed serves as a powerful restraint
on decisions for war, because it is the citizens who
inevitably end up paying the costs’’ (Dixon 1993, 44).
Yet this implies public aversion to war across the board
rather than any discrimination by regime type. And,
since democracies are no less war-prone overall (Doyle
1983; Rosato 2003), their leaders are plainly not con-
strained by any pacifism in the mass public. In any
case, there appears to be no such tendency. Just when,
in Kantian terms, the mobilization of public support
should be most difficult, democratic leaders can usually
expect a rally-’round-the-flag effect (Lai and Reiter
2005; Mueller 1973). More generally, as noted above,
public support for war is not unthinkingly offered or
withheld, but depends on circumstances. The question
remains: is regime type one of those circumstances?
On the cultural/normative account, states apply
democratic norms of behavior—nonviolent conflict
resolution and negotiation—in the international as in
the domestic arena, and, crucially, can expect other
democracies to do the same. In this model, it is the
decision-making elites whose norms and negotiations
ensure the avoidance of war. Yet mass opinion can
still have an important indirect effect. If democratic
publics share the view that democratic states share
their norms and practices, then they will fear these
states less than autocracies and regard military action
against democracies as less easily justified (Owen
1997). Equally, if authoritarian regimes do not share
democratic norms of nonviolence and are not con-
strained by public opinion (Dixon 1993; Russett
1993), the domestic public might well conclude that
‘‘military might is the only instrument the [author-
itarian] adversary will understand and respect, so the
use of force is necessary’’ (Herrmann, Tetlock, and
Visser 1999, 555). In turn, insofar as elites’ foreign
policy decisions are constrained by public preferences,
mass opinion helps to maintain the democratic peace.
On that reading, regime type is a heuristic for
estimating threat. Another possibility has more to do
with the notion of group identities. The public may
be reluctant to attack fellow members of the ‘‘dem-
ocratic club’’ but ready to use force against outsider
authoritarian regimes, in line with overwhelming
evidence that people are more hostile towards out-
groups (Druckman 2001; Kam and Kinder 2007).
There, it is the fact that autocracies are different, as
much as any inference about their behavior, which
drives support for force against them.
In addition to these theoretical considerations,
there is some evidence indicating whether the public
is readier to use force against nondemocracies. Using
convenience samples, Mintz and Geva (1993) ran
three survey experiments in which the adversary’s
regime type was one manipulated feature of a hypo-
thetical conflict situation. Participants in each case
were significantly more likely to approve of military
action against a nondemocratic state.1 Herrmann,
Tetlock, and Visser report different experiments in
which they manipulated the aggressor country: Iran/
Russia/Israel in one and North Korea/China/Japan
in another experiment. They also found that partic-
ipants were ‘‘most willing to use force against the least
democratic . . . and least willing to use force against
advanced democracies’’ (1999, 562). However, since
regime type was not explicitly manipulated, it is quite
possible that the effects are owed to some other
perceived characteristic of those states. The most sig-
nificant existing evidence for our study comes from a
parallel British internet survey experiment, fielded just
two months after our own. Tomz and Weeks (2012)
present respondents with a scenario in which a foreign
state is developing nuclear weapons which it could
potentially then launch ‘‘against any country in the
world.’’ Regime type was one of the details manipu-
lated in the scenario, along with details of the
country’s military power and alliances. Support for
military action against nondemocracies was 13 per-
centage points higher than for action against democ-
racies. In addition, this gap remained as the other
factors were manipulated, suggesting—consistent with
a more identity-based interpretation of the democratic
peace—that the greater willingness to attack author-
itarian regimes is not simply a reflection of strategic
calculation.
Our study extends this research in two important
comparative directions. First, while Tomz and Weeks
(2012) focus on strategic factors, we can compare the
effects of regime type with those of dominant faith,
testing the relative potency of democracy as a signal
or symbol. Second, we run the same experiment in
parallel on U.S. and British samples. We therefore
report the first experiment with a representative
sample of the American public in which the target
state’s regime type is explicitly manipulated. More-
over, we can compare the effects of regime across the
two cases, although in this context we might expect
1They were also likelier to describe the use of force against a
democratic state as a ‘‘failure of foreign policy.’’ People may
therefore be readier to attack autocracies because they see limited
mileage in negotiating with them.
1040 robert johns and graeme a. m. davies
little difference. The United States and the United
Kingdom are both established members of the ‘‘club
of democracies.’’ And, as noted at the outset, recent
elite discourse in both countries placed heavy em-
phasis on the threat from nondemocratic regimes.
There seems no reason to expect U.S. and British
citizens to react differently to the regime type of the
target state. Our hypothesis is therefore:
H1: Citizens in both the United States and Britain are
more likely to approve the use of force against
authoritarian than against democratic states.
Public Opinion and Target
State Religion
Earlier we quoted Huntington’s claim that, following
the Cold War, the critical conflicts are likely to pit the
Christian and the Muslim worlds against one another.
This draws a direct link between religion and foreign
policy. While the thesis generated heated debate among
academics (e.g., Fox 2001; Russett, Oneal, and Cox
2000), it may well have gone largely unnoticed by the
American and British publics during the 1990s. How-
ever, the notion of such a clash was thrust into public
attention by the attacks of September 11, 2001. And it
remained there through the decade, with wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, sporadic attacks by Islamist
terrorists on American and British soil, and disputes
over religious and cultural symbols. As Smidt puts it,
‘‘militant Islam may well have replaced the Soviet
Union in the eyes of most Americans as the object of
opposition in American foreign policy’’ (2005, 246).
Indeed, there are strong grounds to suspect that both
U.S. and British publics will feel more threatened by
predominantly Islamic than by predominantly Chris-
tian states. This does not entail that such perceptions
are accurate. Public perceptions of Islamic states are
not objective assessments but reflect the way that those
states and that faith have been presented to them by
politicians, journalists, priests, and peers (Gershkoff
and Kushner 2005; Hunter 1998; Zaller 1992).
Echoing a distinction drawn in the previous
section, perceptions of greater threat from Islamic
countries could be driven by group identity or by
strategic calculation.2 Huntington’s civilizations may
form the basis for group identity, with citizens seeing
predominantly Christian countries as the ingroup
and predominantly Muslim countries as forming the
outgroup. Outgroup status can itself be sufficient to
generate perceptions of threat and thus in turn lead
to greater hostility against Islamic states (Riek,
Mania, and Gaertner 2006). Alternatively, British or
American citizens may reason (rightly or wrongly)
that Islamic states are more prone to acts of un-
provoked aggression or to other erratic behavior and
hence that military action against them is more likely
to be appropriate. This could be based on interpreta-
tions of past behavior, such as the assumption that the
9/11 attacks represented a particularly Islamic belliger-
ence. It could, however, be based on an association
between Western Christianity and democratic values
and, more pertinently, on the belief that Islam and
those values are in some way at odds. The latter
receives at least prima facie support from the failure
of electoral democracy to take hold in the majority of
Muslim states (Midlarsky 1998). In that case, while the
implication would be the same—greater public read-
iness to use force against Islamic countries—the driv-
ing force would be regime type rather than religion. We
can check this by holding regime type constant when
manipulating dominant faith (and vice versa). Specif-
ically, we test an interactive hypothesis that the effect of
religion depends on regime type: when a country is
democratic and so presumably more trustworthy, its
dominant faith matters less for support for war.
We know of no research directly testing the
proposition that, other things remaining the same,
either the American or British publics are more
inclined to use force against mainly Islamic than
against Christian countries. But indirect evidence
points in that direction. It is clear that Muslims are
indeed an outgroup—part of what Kalkan, Layman,
and Uslaner (2009) call the ‘‘band of others’’—in
American society. They score lower on thermometer
scales than other religious minorities (Panagopoulous
2006), and their religion is widely viewed with
suspicion (Pew Forum 2009; Smidt 2005, 249–50).
Similar patterns emerge in the rather fewer studies of
British opinion towards Muslims and Islam (e.g., Wike
and Grim 2010). Such patterns are unsurprising given
Britain’s complicated imperial history in the Middle
East (Monroe 1965). Then, the furor surrounding
Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, when some Muslim
protestors burned effigies of Rushdie, fomented a
perception of Islam as aggressive and authoritarian
(Abbas 2005; Kepel 1997). Thus, the 9/11 attacks and
the subsequent London bombings only exacerbated an
existing media tendency to characterize a threatening
Muslim ‘‘other’’ (Baker 2010; Poynting and Mason
2006). We therefore hypothesize:
2This distinction should not be overdrawn. There is a complex
connection between the cognitive and affective elements of group
identity and the perceived threat from an outgroup is likely to be
a function of both types.
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H2: Citizens in both the United States and Britain are
more likely to approve the use of force against mainly
Islamic than against mainly Christian states;
H3: The effect of dominant faith is reduced when
states are democratic.
Religiousness and Reactions to
Target State Faith
In an obvious case of the predisposition-situation
interactions described by Herrmann, Tetlock, and
Visser (1999), we expect individuals’ own religious
beliefs and affiliations to influence their reactions to
target state religion. It is unclear whether nonreli-
gious people will be more willing to use force against
Islamic than against Christian countries, but it is clear
that we would expect them to discriminate less in this
respect than Christian respondents. Several studies
confirm a religious dimension to American public
opinion on the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Support for these interventions was not only stronger
among those taking a more negative view of Islam
(Smidt 2005) but was also markedly stronger among
adherents to Christian denominations than among
those disclaiming any such affiliation (Guth 2009).
However, a more detailed scrutiny requires us to
move well beyond a crude dichotomy separating
‘‘Christians’’ from the ‘‘nonreligious.’’ Among Chris-
tian adherents, at least three other distinctions deserve
consideration. The first of these is behavioral. In the
literature on religion and foreign policy attitudes,
relatively little attention has been paid to the question
of whether frequency of church attendance or prayer
is correlated with a more militarist disposition. An
exception, the study of ‘‘Messianic Militarism’’ by
Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008), indicates that
the relationship, while weak, is if anything negative,
perhaps due to the pacifism preached in many Chris-
tian traditions. If that is indeed the reason, it highlights
the key point: that attendance betokens stronger
commitment to that religious tradition and is liable
to intensify the persuasive effects of its teaching. Hence,
if we do find that Christians are particularly inclined to
discriminate against Islamic states when evaluating
military action, we might expect that tendency to be
strongest amongst the most frequent attendees.
The second distinction, denomination, has gen-
erally explained rather little variation in Americans’
foreign policy attitudes (Ribuffo 1998; Wittkopf 1990).
Catholics have tended to be slightly less hawkish than
‘‘mainline’’ Protestants, but the differences are minor,
and neither group was much different from nonreli-
gious respondents in surveys examining approval of the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Baumgartner, Francia, and
Morris 2008; Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009).
As the qualifier ‘‘mainline’’ implies, a much more
powerful predictor of foreign policy attitudes is the
third distinction: belonging to an Evangelical church or
identifying as a ‘‘born-again’’ Christian (the two being
closely but not perfectly correlated—see Wilcox and
Larson (2006) and below). Evangelicals have been
found to be markedly more supportive of military
action in a range of contexts (Froese and Mencken
2009; Guth 2009; Jelen 1994). The fact that some of
this evidence predates 9/11 leads us to expect a ‘‘main
effect’’ of Evangelicalism, ‘‘born-again’’ Christians
being more supportive of military action regardless of
the dominant faith in the target state. Nonetheless,
given the politicization of religion in the United States,
and especially the strong support for Bush’s foreign
policy from prominent Evangelicals such as Pat
Robertson and James Dobson (Barker, Hurwitz, and
Nelson 2008; Durham 2004), we can reasonably expect
an interaction with target state faith—that is, ‘‘born-
again’’ Christians disproportionately willing to take
action against an Islamic country.
H4: The effect of dominant faith is stronger among
Christians than nonreligious citizens.
H5a: The effect of dominant faith is particularly
strong among those Christians who attend church
frequently.
H5b: The effect of dominant faith is particularly
strong among those Christians adhering to Evangel-
ical traditions.
The key variables in those hypotheses have implica-
tions for our comparison between the United States
and the United Kingdom. Religious affiliation is much
rarer in Britain than in the United States and, even
among those who do report such an affiliation, the
large majority attend church rarely or never (Voas and
Ling 2010). We might therefore expect the overall
effect of target state religion on support for war to be
weaker. Moreover, religion is far less politicized in
Britain than in the United States. The notion of a
‘‘crusade’’ was absent from British political or religious
discourse about the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq.3 And
there is no significant Evangelical tradition in Britain.
Put another way, virtually all Protestants are ‘‘main-
line’’ Protestants. There is also much less diversity in
terms of denominations. All this considered, we would
3It is telling that, in the only multivariate analysis of British
attitudes to the Iraq war published to date, religion was not even
included as a predictor (Clarke et al. 2009, chap. 4).
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expect the interaction between religious affiliation and
target state religion—that is, the ‘‘effect of being
religious’’—to be weaker in Britain than in the United
States. We therefore specify the following main
hypotheses:
H6: The main effect of dominant faith is weaker in
Britain than in the United States;
H7: Any interactions between respondents’ religion
and dominant faith are weaker in Britain than in the
United States.
Data and Measures
The empirical basis for this study is a 2010 survey
experiment conducted in parallel on American and
British samples. The U.S. data (N 5 2,075, response
rate 5 67.4%) were collected in a survey fielded
under the auspices of the Time-Sharing Experiments
for the Social Sciences (TESS) project. Fieldwork was
conducted over the internet by Knowledge Networks
(KN). The KN online panel via which TESS surveys
are implemented is a probability-based panel, se-
lected using random-digit dial (RDD) and address-
based sampling methods, and is representative of U.S.
adults. In order to cover the off-line population,
households are provided with access to the internet
and hardware if needed.
The British data are taken from Waves 1 and 2 of
a major study of foreign policy attitudes (Wave 1:
N 5 1,276, response rate 5 62.2%;4 Wave 2:
N51,065, retention rate 5 83.4%). The surveys, like
that reported by Tomz and Weeks (2012), were
administered over the internet by YouGov, whose
approximately 300,000 panel members formed the
sampling frame. Unlike KN, YouGov uses an opt-in
panel. This is a nonprobability sample—the off-line
population is not covered. Hence, we cannot simply
pool the U.S. and British data or calculate the
statistical significance of differences across the two
cases. Instead, we run each analysis in parallel. With
this approach, there are reasons to suppose that the
results are broadly comparable. Most YouGov pan-
elists are actively recruited rather than volunteering.
Similarly, respondents cannot choose when to take
part: they are either sampled for a given survey or
not. And the company’s record in predicting vote
shares suggests that its sampling and weighting
procedures achieve politically representative samples
of the British electorate.5
Survey Experiment
The empirical cornerstone of our study is the experi-
ment measuring the impact of target state regime
type and dominant faith on willingness to use force.
This experiment is based on a vignette presented in
the form of a newspaper story.6 The story, loosely
based on recent debates about Iran but making no
explicit reference to that or any other real country,
concerns the possibility of launching air strikes on a
target state in an attempt to halt a secretive nuclear
weapons program.7 This vignette captures two key
features of Bush-era foreign policy debates: preemp-
tion, since the target state has taken no military
action; and dispute about the threat, with the very
existence of the weapons program a matter of ‘‘our
government’s word against theirs’’ as far as the public is
concerned. Both contribute to uncertainty and thereby
increase the usefulness—if not the accuracy—of heu-
ristics such as regime type and dominant faith. The
vignette, with manipulations highlighted in bold, is
presented below.
This question is about a situation in which
Britain might take military action. Please read the
4The response rates are not strictly comparable. Since members of
the KN panel have a known probability of selection, it is feasible
to calculate a response rate taking into account all sources of
nonresponse, including panel recruitment and retention. With
the YouGov opt-in panel, response rates are, in effect, completion
rates, representing the proportion of those asked to take part in
that survey that agreed to do so.
5There are two further points to note about the British study.
First, because the experiment and other questions were embed-
ded into a longer survey, the overall instrument is not the same as
that fielded in the United States. But the questionnaires were
designed to minimize order effects, with embedded experiments
preceded and followed by questions on a different topic. Second,
it was fielded a little earlier (Wave 1, 18–19 Jan; Wave 2, 1–8 Feb)
than the TESS survey (16–26 Mar). Fortunately, no major foreign
policy events occurred in the interim.
6This differs from the approach taken in Tomz and Weeks (2012),
whereby regime type and other details about the target state were
listed as bullet points. We sought to reproduce more closely the
way that it would be conveyed to the public. It seems likely that
manipulations worked into a newspaper story will generate weaker
effects than the blunter bullet-point presentation.
7While the generally limited public knowledge about interna-
tional affairs suggests that the Iranian connection will elude
many, prior beliefs about Iran could influence at least some
respondents’ reactions to the scenario and to the experimental
variables. Fortunately, the British survey included a detailed
battery of questions about attitudes to Iran. Controlling for these
changes none of our substantive findings. While we do not have
the measures for a parallel test in the United States, it seems
unlikely that a dramatically different pattern would emerge.
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following description of that situation and then
answer the question below.
‘‘Today the British/American government has pre-
sented evidence to the United Nations that Country
A has been developing a secret nuclear weapons
program which it intends to use against its neighbors
in the region. The government is making the case for
air strikes against factories associated with this
program. Professor Andrew Lincoln, a leading expert
on military strategy, has estimated that the planned
British/American air strikes would result in the deaths
of around one hundred/ three thousand civilians/
[sentence omitted]. The democratically-elected Presi-
dent/unelected dictator of Country A, a predomi-
nantly Christian/Islamic country of around 20 million
people, has strenuously denied the British govern-
ment’s allegations.’’
Three aspects of the story were therefore subject
to random manipulation: the estimated number of
civilian casualties (either not mentioned, 100 or
3,000), the regime type (introduced by reference to
the head of state: democratically elected President or
unelected dictator) and the dominant faith (Christian
or Islamic).8 In this article, we do not analyze the
casualty manipulation, and the results are therefore
collapsed across values of that variable.9
The newspaper story is followed by two questions
providing dependent variables for the upcoming anal-
yses. The second question forces respondents to come
down on one side of the fence and provides a simple
‘‘percentage support’’ figure to ease comparisons.
d On a scale from 0 (strongly oppose) to 6 (strongly
support), how do you feel about British/American
air strikes in this case?
d And if you had to choose ‘‘oppose’’ or ‘‘support,’’
which would you go for?
Additional Variables
The most important individual-level variables in the
analyses concern respondent’s religious identifica-
tions and behavior. In the analyses involving any
individual-level religious variables, all of those
reporting a non-Christian religious affiliation—
including Muslims—were omitted. The alternative
was cells too sparse for useful analysis. Our most basic
variable is thus a simple dichotomy: Christian or
nonreligious. The same cell size means that we cannot
do justice to the rich variety of Christian traditions in
the United States. But we can make the key distinc-
tions identified in previous research on religion and
foreign policy opinion. In particular, we follow Guth
(2009) in distinguishing ethno-religious categories
rather than merging what are often very distinct black
and white congregations (Steensland et al. 2000). In
particular, while many African American Protestants
describe themselves as ‘‘born again,’’ they may attend
churches with a pacifist outlook very different from
that in white Evangelical traditions. So we distinguish
seven groups: Mainline Protestant; Evangelical Protes-
tant; Black Protestant; White Catholic; Hispanic Cath-
olic; Mormon; and Other Christian.10 The equivalent
U.K. variable has four categories: Church of England/
Scotland, Catholic, Nonconformist, and Other Christian.
The measures of religious attendance differed slightly
across the two surveys and so, in order to generate com-
parable measures, we collapse these into three categories:
frequently (once a week or more); occasionally (at least
once a year); or nonattendance (less than once a year
or never).
One problem in estimating the interactions be-
tween predispositional variables (like religious iden-
tity) and situational variables (like target state religion)
is that these effects may be spurious. The fact that
Christians are disproportionately willing to use force
against Muslim countries may simply reflect differ-
ences in partisanship, ideology, or personality between
religious and nonreligious people. Space to measure
such differences was very tight on the TESS survey; but
it does include the standard 7-point partisanship scale,
and we were also able to include three Likert items
tapping the core personality variables of nationalism,
8Experimental control does not extend to what respondents read
into categories like ‘‘democracy’’ or ‘‘Islamic.’’ The result is what
Tomz and Weeks (2012) call ‘‘information leakage,’’ with such
terms conveying information about other features of the target
state that are also relevant for the dependent variable. Since these
features cannot all be manipulated in one experiment, the precise
sources of the effects remain hard to pinpoint. Yet information
leakage is a substantive as well as a methodological issue. Perhaps
it is precisely because citizens infer a good deal from regime type
and dominant faith that these factors influence support for war.
This does not make the effects any less real or important. Future
research should explore in detail the inferences drawn by
respondents from such signifiers as ‘‘democracy’’ and ‘‘dictator-
ship’’ and ‘‘Islamic’’ or ‘‘Christian country.’’
9The casualty manipulation is analyzed in a separate article
focused on public reactions to civilian casualties. Here, we
maintain the focus on target state characteristics.
10The Black Protestant and Catholic categories are based on the
KN measures of ethnicity and denomination. However, when it
comes to white Protestants, the latter variable conflates mainline
and Evangelical strands within broad categories such as ‘‘Baptist’’
or ‘‘Other Protestant.’’ To differentiate mainline and Evangelical
Protestants, we used a follow-up question in which respondents
reporting a Christian affiliation were asked ‘‘Would you describe
yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?’’
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authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation
(SDO). All three would be expected to predict
discrimination between target states and all three
are associated with—and might be thought of as caus-
ally prior to—religious affiliation (Altemeyer 2003;
Hunsberger 1995; McFarland 2005). These single items
are obviously crude measures of the underlying
orientations but, together, they go some way to
controlling for those aspects of personality that might
generate spurious effects of respondent religion.
d [Nationalism] ‘‘Generally speaking, Britain/America
is better than other countries.’’
d [Authoritarianism, reverse scored] ‘‘People in Britain/
America should be more tolerant of those who lead
unconventional lives.’’
d [Social dominance] ‘‘Some people are just more
deserving than others.’’
Results
We present the results in three sections. First, using
the dichotomous dependent variable, we analyze how
the percentage support for military action depends
on our experimental variables. Second, for more com-
plex models testing interactions between situational
variables and respondent religion, we turn to ANOVA
based on the 7-point scale dependent variable. In the
third section, we focus only on Christian respondents,
assessing whether aspects of their religious identifica-
tions and behavior moderate reactions to target state
faith.
Main Effects of Regime Type and
Dominant Faith
In Table 1 we report the percentage of U.S. and British
respondents that opted to support military action
against Country A, broken down first by regime type
and dominant faith separately and then by the two in
interaction. For the main effects, we also report two
simple measures of effect size: the percentage differ-
ence in support, and phi, a measure of correlation
between these dichotomous variables.
The first point to note is that the American
public is noticeably more hawkish than the British.
This cross-national difference is fairly consistent across
experimental conditions and is also wider than the
differences generated by the experimental variables.
Nonetheless, there is clear support for H1 and H2. In
both countries, respondents were significantly more
likely to support military action against dictatorships
than against democracies and against mainly Islamic
than against mainly Christian states. For the British
public, the regime type effect is noticeably smaller than
that reported by Tomz and Weeks (2012), possibly for
the methodological reasons noted above. Nonetheless,
both the democratic peace and the clash of civiliza-
tions find reflections in American and British public
attitudes to the use of force.
We did not anticipate U.S.-British differences in
the effect of regime type and the results bear out that
null hypothesis: if the democracy-dictatorship gap
is slightly wider in the United Kingdom, the differ-
ence is negligible. But we did hypothesize that the
American public would be more influenced by target
state faith (H6), and so here the similarity across
cases is more surprising. Judging by the phi coef-
ficients, the effect of dominant faith is as strong in
Britain as in the United States. (The percentage
difference is slightly smaller with the British data
but only because all percentages are smaller in more
pacific Britain.) This is a striking finding given the
lower salience of religion in British politics and
society, a point we return to in the conclusion.
TABLE 1 Percentage Support for Air Strikes by
Regime Type and Dominant Faith
across Countries
% Supporting Air
Strikes
US Britain
Regime Type
Democracy 44.7 34.7
Dictatorship 49.4 41.0
% difference 4.7 6.3
Phi 0.05** 0.07**
Dominant Faith
Christian 43.5 34.8
Islamic 50.6 41.1
% difference 7.1 6.3
Phi 0.07** 0.07**
Regime Type * Dominant Faith
Christian democracy 41.7 29.3
Christian dictatorship 45.3 40.4
Islamic democracy 47.9 40.7
Islamic dictatorship 53.2 41.7
N 2035 1268
Note: * 5 p, 0.1; ** 5 p, 0.05; *** 5 p, 0.01.
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We turn now to the interaction between these
two variables, as shown in the final rows of the table.
In H3, we suggested that dominant faith would matter
less with democratic states, on the Huntingtonian
grounds that the key difference between Western and
Muslim civilizations lies in the latter’s rejection of the
democratic values (see Norris and Inglehart 2002).
This hypothesis can be dismissed. Both publics were
significantly more supportive of action against Islamic
democracies than Christian democracies. Further-
more, both proved as willing to attack Islamic democ-
racies as to attack Christian dictatorships. If anything,
dominant faith trumps regime type, especially in the
United States. In Britain, there was a subtler pattern,
although again opposite to that hypothesized. Regime
type mattered a good deal for Christian states but
hardly at all for Islamic states. For many in the British
public, Christianity and democracy both look like
necessary conditions for target states to elicit a dovish
reaction.
Regime Type, Dominant Faith, and
Respondent Religion
The basis for this section is the three ANOVAs in
Table 2. The first includes only the variables—regime
type and dominant faith—analyzed just above.11 It
enables us to retest the core hypotheses H1–H3 using
the 7-point scale dependent variable—including for-
mal tests of the interactions between the factors—and
also provides a baseline for comparison with subse-
quent models. In the second model, we introduce
respondent’s religious affiliation and test the inter-
actions posited in H4. For the third model, we add
partisanship and the Likert personality items in order
to gauge whether this weakens the effects of respondent
religion. With each analysis, we report the F-statistics
(and accompanying significance values) and partial
eta (h), a measure of effect size comparable to a
standardized regression coefficient.
For the British, Model 1 reinforces the findings
from Table 1. Both regime type and dominant faith
have significant effects on support for military action,
and the effects are broadly similar in size. However,
the conclusions about the United States have changed
somewhat. When respondents were given a scale rather
than forced to ‘‘support’’ or ‘‘oppose,’’ the stronger
impact of dominant faith shows through. This applies
to some extent when comparing across countries: the
dominant faith effect looks stronger in the United
States (h 5 0.09) than in Britain (h 5 0.06). Yet there
remains little support for H6—the transatlantic differ-
ences are small. The more striking (and statistically
significant) difference is across variables. While dom-
inant faith and regime type had roughly equal influence
over the British public, the American public’s decisions
were clearly driven more by religion (h 5 0.09) than
regime (h 5 0.03). So the effect suggested in H2 is
significant in both countries but stronger in the United
States, but the effect posited in H1 is significant only in
Britain. Meanwhile, H3 can be definitively rejected
since there is no sign in either country of an interaction
between regime and dominant faith. One final point to
note is that neither of the experimental variables shows
a particularly strong effect, with partial hs below 0.1
(and thus partial h2s below 0.01). As a result, the
proportion of variance explained by the overall model
is very small (R2 in Britain being boosted mainly by the
demographic controls). We return to the issue of effect
size in concluding the article.
Introducing respondents’ religion—via the
‘‘Christian or nonreligious’’ dichotomy—into the
model (Model 2) has a very different impact in
the two cases. In the United States, the main effect
of target state faith is reduced to nonsignificance
(though it appears nonnegligible in size) while there
is a significant interaction between dominant faith and
respondent religion. In other words, the main reason
for Americans’ relative reluctance to attack Christian
nations is that many respondents are self-identified
Christians. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, the
main effect of target state faith is undiminished when
respondent religion is controlled and the predisposi-
tions themselves have no significant effect. Clash of
civilizations discourse seems to have traction with at
least some British people, regardless of their own
religious affiliation. British Christians were no more
likely than their secular compatriots to discriminate
between Islamic and Christian states in assessing
military action. In short, H4 receives clear support in
the U.S. public but none in Britain, and H7 is
supported because a clear interaction between re-
spondent religion and dominant faith in the United
States is not significant in Britain
Before exploring these contrasting effects of
respondent religion, it is worth checking whether
they simply reflect broader differences in political
outlook. Partisanship and the items tapping nation-
alism, authoritarianism, and SDO are introduced in
Model 3. As expected, all are significant predictors
of support for military action. The more pressing
11These models also include basic sociodemographic controls: for
age, gender, and education. To save space in Table 2, coefficients
for the control variables are reported in Table A1 in the online
appendix.
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question here is whether the target regime and target
faith effects persist when these more general orienta-
tions are controlled; and the answer is that they do.
There remain main effects of regime type and
dominant faith in Britain but not the United States,
and there remains an interaction between target state
faith and respondent religion in the United States but
not in Britain. The greater willingness to use force
against Islamic countries is not driven just by partisan-
ship, nationalism, or authoritarianism. The most
noticeable effect of introducing these variables is to
eliminate what had been a strong main effect of
respondent religion in the United States. The reason
why American Christians were more hawkish is not
because they are religious; it is because they are more
likely to be Republicans, and more prone to general-
ized prejudice and a belief that some groups can
legitimately dominate others.
Having established that the effects of dominant
faith are robust against these attitudinal controls, we
now illustrate the different patterns of results across
the two countries. Figure 1 shows how mean support
for action varies by dominant faith and respondent
religion in the United States and Britain. Error bars
are included, indicating the 95% confidence interval
around each mean value. While the effect sizes are
not striking, the contrast is clear. Among the British
public, the effect of target state religion does not
differ by respondent religion. Both Christians and
nonreligious respondents are somewhat more likely
to support this action against an Islamic state than
against a Christian state. By contrast, Christians and
nonreligious citizens in the United States react differ-
ently to target state religion. While American Chris-
tians were noticeably more likely to support the use
of force against a predominantly Islamic than against
a Christian state, their nonreligious counterparts show
signs of discriminating in the other direction (although,
partly due to the small numbers of secular Americans,
TABLE 2 Analyses of Variance in Support for Air Strikes by Regime Type, Dominant Faith, Respondent
Religion and Attitudinal Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
USA Britain USA Britain USA Britain
F h F h F h F h F h F h
Target regime 1.2 0.03 4.0** 0.06 0.9 0.02 4.3** 0.06 0.8 0.02 3.3* 0.06
Target faith 16.7*** 0.09 3.6* 0.06 2.2 0.03 3.4* 0.06 2.4 0.03 3.3* 0.06
Target faith * Target regime 0.4 0.01 0.7 0.03 0.3 0.01 0.8 0.03 0.0 0.00 0.8 0.03
Christian 11.9*** 0.08 1.7 0.04 0.0 0.00 1.3 0.03
Target faith * Christian 4.0** 0.05 0.0 0.00 5.2** 0.05 0.1 0.01
Party identification 24.7*** 0.11 5.5 0.12
Authoritarianism 39.7*** 0.17 23.6*** 0.14
Nationalism 126.3*** 0.27 13.5*** 0.11
Social dominance 16.2*** 0.09 3.4* 0.06
R2 (adj.) 0.019 0.048 0.025 0.048 0.151 0.096
N 1,972 1,054 1,972 1,054 1,972 1,054
Note: In order to maintain comparability across the models, we use listwise deletion to test all three on the same sample. The
authoritarianism and social dominance items appeared in the second wave of the British study, and so that sample reflects the attrition
between the first and second waves. We also tested the simpler models on the larger (Wave 1 only) sample and the results—available
from the authors on request—were virtually identical.
* 5 p, 0.1; ** 5 p, 0.05; *** 5 p, 0.01.
FIGURE 1 Mean Support for Air Strikes by
Dominant Faith and Respondent
Religion across Countries
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the confidence intervals overlap in the latter case). In
the concluding section, we discuss possible reasons why
nonreligious respondents react differently in the two
countries.
Christians’ Reactions to Dominant Faith
Next, we test two further models on the British and
American Christian subsamples. In the first of these,
the three-category measure of church attendance is
added. We know from previous analyses that there is
a main effect of target state faith among both American
and British Christians. These effects remain significant
and relatively strong in Model 4 (in Table 3), confirm-
ing that such discrimination is not confined to frequent
churchgoers or, for that matter, to nonpractising Chris-
tians. In the United States, there is no support for H5a:
religious attendance plays little or no role. Contrary to
H7, the moderating effects of religious behavior are
actually stronger—and significant only—in Britain.
Figure 2 illustrates these effects. One point, namely
that more frequent attendees are particularly influ-
enced by dominant faith, might have been expected.
However, this is driven by greater reluctance to attack
Christian states than by greater willingness to attack
Islamic states. Church attendance in Britain seems to
generate solidarity with fellow Christians rather than
a general commitment to pacifism. In the United
States, there is the hint of an effect, with the least
frequent attendees also the least likely to discriminate
by target state faith. While that interaction is not
statistically significant, it does suggest that a further
breakdown by religious identification may yield
significant differences—that is, that attendance at
certain churches does drive discrimination by target
state faith.
TABLE 3 Analyses of Variance in Support for Air Strikes by Regime Type, Dominant Faith, and Religious
Variables—Christian Respondents Only
Model 4 Model 5
USA Britain USA Britain
F h F h F h F h
Target regime 1.1 0.03 0.4 0.03 0.8 0.02 0.8 0.04
Target faith 18.4*** 0.11 5.4** 0.11 4.0** 0.06 0.6 0.04
Target faith * Target regime 0.0 0.00 1.2 0.05 0.0 0.00 0.8 0.04
Attendance 0.6 0.03 3.9** 0.13 0.9 0.03 3.2** 0.12
Target faith * Attendance 1.1 0.04 3.3** 0.12 0.6 0.03 3.1** 0.12
Mainline Protestant 0.2 0.01 – –
Evangelical 0.9 0.02 – –
Black Protestant 1.3 0.03 – –
White Catholic 0.0 0.00 – –
Hispanic Catholic 0.3 0.01 – –
Mormon 0.9 0.02 – –
Target faith * Mainline Protestant 0.4 0.02 – –
Target faith * Evangelical 1.7 0.03 – –
Target faith * Black Protestant 2.9* 0.04 – –
Target faith * White Catholic 0.8 0.02 – –
Target faith * Hispanic Catholic 2.9* 0.04 – –
Target faith * Mormon 0.8 0.02 – –
Anglican – – 0.4 0.03
Catholic – – 0.1 0.02
Nonconformist – – 4.8** 0.10
Target faith * Anglican – – 0.4 0.03
Target faith * Catholic – – 0.0 0.00
Target faith * Nonconformist – – 0.1 0.01
R2 (adj.) 0.011 0.024 0.013 0.033
N 1,653 454 1,653 454
Note: * 5 p, 0.1; ** 5 p, 0.05; *** 5 p, 0.01.
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To explore that possibility, we estimated Model 5
in which denominational variables are added. The
reference group is the residual category of ‘‘Other
Christians.’’ The first point to note is the dearth of
significant effects. Nonetheless, as the R2 values show,
the few differences among Christians are again stron-
ger in Britain. The effects of attendance from Figure 2
remain and are of similar size. Denomination also
has a main effect—mean support being significantly
lower among nonconformists (1.69) than among any
of the other three groups (the mean for the Anglican
majority being 2.35)—but shows no interaction with
target state faith. The denominations vary in general
willingness to take military action rather than will-
ingness to take action against particular types of target
state.
The more striking results are the null findings
from the U.S. analysis. We do not see main effects
of the kind that previous research on religion—
Evangelicalism in particular—and militarism would
imply. Second, none of the interactions are significant
at the 95% level. The largest partial eta remains the
main effect of dominant faith, suggesting little het-
erogeneity in Christians’ reactions to the manipula-
tion.12 There is at least some sign that Evangelical
Protestants are more militarist, both in general and
especially against Islamic states, than mainline Prot-
estants. But, even on a generous p, 0.10 criterion,
H5b is rejected.13 The chief contrast within the U.S.
public is not among Christians but between Chris-
tians and the nonreligious. The reverse is true of the
British.
Conclusion
Jentleson (1992) characterized the American public as
‘‘pretty prudent’’ when it came to support for war.
Judgments about the use of force looked to be based
sensibly and predictably on factors such as the central
objective of military action and the extent of
American interests at stake. The regime type effects
observed in our study tend to support Jentleson’s
argument (and suggest also that prudence extends to
the British public). Assuming that theorists of the
democratic peace are correct, authoritarian regimes
pose more threat to democracies than do other
democracies, and so the public’s greater willingness
to take action against dictatorships looks like rational
preemptive self-defense.
It is more debatable whether the discrimination
by target state religion—a stronger effect than that of
regime—can also be seen as prudent or rational.
Dominant faith was not simply used as a cue to gauge
regime type: respondents were readier to use force
against Islamic than Christian states, regardless of
their political make-up. Indeed, both the U.S. and
British publics were slightly more hawkish against
Islamic democracies than against Christian dictator-
ships. This could be seen as reasonable given that,
‘‘from a Western perspective, the proportion of
civilizational conflicts involving Western groups that
are with Islamic groups increased dramatically after
the end of the Cold War’’ (Fox 2001, 459). Citizens
may believe this conflict to have reached a point where,
even if Islamic states are internally democratic, they
cannot be relied upon to observe democratic norms
on the world stage. Yet there are actually few examples
of Islamic states—let alone Islamic democracies—
launching the kind of attack hinted at in the vignette.
The fact that dominant faith mattered more to the
public than regime type clashes with the evidence
FIGURE 2 Mean Support for Air Strikes by
Dominant Faith and Religious
Attendance across Countries—Christian
Respondents Only
12The results by denomination are illustrated in Figure A1 in the
online appendix. It shows mean support for force by target
state faith among each of the five religious categories with an N of
over 100.
13To test the robustness of this null finding, we tried two other
specifications: Model 6, with a three-way interaction between
target state faith, attendance, and denomination; and Model 7, in
which we dropped denominations and used only the subjective
‘‘born again’’ dichotomy. The interaction between Evangelicalism
and target state faith remains stubbornly nonsignificant. These
results are in Table A2 in the online appendix.
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reported by Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) that the
democratic peace thesis remains a much better predic-
tor of interstate conflict than is the clash of civilizations.
Whether or not discrimination against Islamic
target states is rational, it is worth noting that image
theory (Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston 2005)
provides a straightforward alternative account. Images
of international actors are based not (only) on their
behavior but also on subjective judgments about their
norms and motivations. Those judgments are highly
likely to be biased along the lines of group identities.
Thus, the more that religion becomes a salient basis for
group identity, the more likely that citizens will
attribute malign motivations to those—whether indi-
viduals or states—of other religions and, in turn, feel
less compunction about acting to combat that threat.
This seems to us a reasonable characterization of the
way public opinion has reacted to Islam since the 9/11
attacks. To reiterate: this account does not imply that
Islamic states really do pose more of a threat than
Christian states or than they did 20 years ago. The
point is that a process of image (re)construction has
led at least some citizens to believe that. This notion of
construction highlights the power held by elites and
other opinion leaders. The conduct of adversaries can
of course be framed and interpreted in different ways,
but ultimately it is difficult to pretend military action
has happened when it has not, or vice versa. It is easier
to construct a negative image around a signifier like
Islam, intensifying perceptions of threat and creating
expectations of future behavior.14 In a preemptive
context, that sense of threat may convince the public
to endorse military action.
We should not overstate the power of elite
framing, however. Neither of our experimental varia-
bles explained large portions of the variation in support
for military action. That said, it is worth noting that the
percentage differences here are similar to those re-
ported by Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) in
experiments manipulating other features—notably the
power and motivations—of the target state. Those
authors observed markedly stronger effects when ma-
nipulating the extent to which ‘‘home’’ (in that case,
United States) interests were at stake. On the other
hand, both regime type and dominant faith had slightly
stronger effects in our experiment than did the civilian
casualty manipulation that was also included.
Turning to the comparative side of our analysis,
our expectations were often confounded. While we
predicted that target state religion would matter more
to the Americans, it seems that the British have a
similarly negative image of Islamic states’ motivations
and behavior. As noted earlier, this is consistent with
representations of Muslims in the British media. If it
still seems counterintuitive, given the markedly lower
salience of religion in British politics and society, the
explanation is clear enough: negativity towards Islam
in Britain was not driven by (respondents’) religion.
Discrimination by target state religion was as strong
among nonreligious people as among Christians.
Perhaps, with religion less salient and less entangled
with national identity than in the United States, the
British public interpreted an event like the July 7th
bombings in London as an Islamic attack on the
nation, whereas the American public interpreted 9/11
as an attack not just on the United States but on
Christianity. That argument gains support from
another notable result, namely the homogeneity of
U.S. Christians’ reactions to target state faith. There
was little indication that Evangelicals were more
militarist in general, or inclined to attack Islamic
states in particular. Any such effects were much
weaker than the tendency among Christians as a
whole to discriminate by target state religion.
That still leaves the question of why nonreligious
citizens in the two countries reacted differently. Why
didn’t secular Americans discriminate against Islamic
states in the way their British counterparts did? The
likeliest explanation again lies in the differing salience
of religion. In Britain, ties between religion and
politics—including foreign policy—are few and loose,
and there is no major religious-secular divide. As a
result, being ‘‘nonreligious’’ is rarely a key facet of
political identity. In the United States, by contrast,
where religious affiliates are the clear majority and
many highly charged debates pit secular against
religious opinion, being a non-Christian is more likely
to constitute a positive group identity (rather than
simply the absence of religious identity). Christians,
notably Evangelical Protestants, are the outgroup to
this secular ingroup, and attitudes between the
two have polarized. So, if a prominent characteristic
of Christian thinking on foreign policy is to dis-
criminate against Islamic states, we would expect
nonreligious Americans to react against that kind of
discrimination.
Future research should address the perceptual
variables explaining why the public is readier to
take action against autocracies and Islamic states. It
would also be instructive to test whether the relative
14In this sense, our experimental findings probably understate
dominant faith effects. We simply mentioned the word ‘‘Islamic’’
or ‘‘Christian’’; politicians, journalists, and church leaders may
use those terms as the basis for building much richer images,
positive or negative, that would have a more powerful influence
on public opinion.
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importance of regime type and religion varies across
different military scenarios. But perhaps the most
important requirement for further research is time.
Perhaps discrimination by regime type is a persistent
feature of foreign policy opinion while discrimination
by dominant faith is a sign of recent times. However,
once established, a negative image can take a long time
to wear off. For now, if U.S. and British governments
are trying to generate support for military action
against Islamic states—whatever their regime type—
then the religion card looks a worryingly useful one
to play.
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